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have the capacity to understand and follow the pattern of conduct
required by the statute, his violation thereof could be deemed con-
tributory negligence, barring his recovery. On the other hand, if the
minority rule is followed, the special standard of care for children
is necessarily abrogated and their violation of the statute will be
characterized by the court as contributory negligence per se. The
courts generally recognize that a special standard of conduct applies
to children because they realize that an infant does not have the
capacity to perceive the inherent risks and dangers in certain sit-
uations.2 7 There is no reason to obliterate this standard merely be-
cause a statute has been violated. If the child does not have the
capacity to understand and follow the pattern of conduct required
by the statute, he should not be judged by it.
2 8
Frank N. King, Jr.
ToRTs-Jom=r To TFEAsoRs-APPORTnONMENT OF DAMAGES BY DEGOEES
OF NEGLIGENCE.- Plaintiff, after stopping his automobile, was struck
from the rear by a taxicab. A third car in the line of traffic stopped
short of impact, but was subsequently struck from the rear causing
it to collide with the taxicab, which was then forced into the plain-
tiff's car a second time. In an action against the owners and drivers
of the three cars, the trial court granted summary judgment on the
ground that plaintiff received two separate injuries and failed to
sustain his burden of proof as to which injury resulted from each
impact. Held: Reversed. No evidence was presented to sustain a find-
ing that planitiff incurred more than a single injury and where the
concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons combine to cause a single injury to another,1 such persons
27 See, for example, Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 Atl. 457
(1931); see also, Prosser, op. cit. supra mote 10, at 128; Restatement, op. cit. supra
note 7, § 283 comment e.
28 It appears that the court, in this portion of the decision, complied with
the general desire of the legislature. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.570(4)(d) (1959)
further provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection every operator of
a vehicle . . . shall exercise proper precaution upon observing a child
• . . upon a roadway.
Thiis, the legislature, realizing that children may lack the capacity to appreci-
ate the risk involved in running across a street at a place other than a cross-
walk, preferred to give protection to the infant violator.
I The difficulty posed by the cause-in-fact issue is overcome by holding that
only one tort occurred, and only the fact that each defendant's negligence was
involved need be shown. An analogy is drawn from the cases where death re-
sults from the independent successive negligence acts of two persons; the death
is presumed to have occurred subsequent to the second act of negligence. E.g.,
Miclli v. Hirsch, 52 Ohio L. abs. 426, 83 N.E.2d 240 (1948). See also 4 Re-
statement, Torts § 879 (1938), as qualified by § 881.
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may be jointly or severally liable for the damages. The jury, when
finding several damages may assess against each tortfeasor an amount
commensurate with his amount2 of negligence. Murphy v. Taxicabs
of Louisville, Inc., 830 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1959).
In the present case the Kentucky Court affirmed its previous posi-
tion that the allocation of damages does not depend upon the deter-
mination of the extent of injury caused by the negligence of each tort-
feasor, but rests entirely on the degree of his negligence. The pur-
pose of this comment is to discuss the desirability of this procedure
and its effect on the law of contribution in this jurisdiction.
The common law rule, based on the indivisible nature of the in-
jury, required the jury to return a single joint verdict, and the entire
amount of the judgment entered thereon might be recovered from
any one of the joint tortfeasors.3 In 1839, this rule was modified in
Kentucky by the adoption of a statute which provides:
In actions of trespass the jury may assess joint or several damages
against the defendants. When the jury finds several damages, the
judgment shall be in favor of the plaintiff against each defendant
for the several damages, without regard to the amount claimed in
the petition.. ... 4
Apparently, this statute was designed to eliminate the harshness
of the required joint judgment wherein one who had merely com-
mitted acts sufficient to be classified as a joint tortleasor might be
"mulcted in heavy damages by reason of the lawless conduct of some
co-defendant. ... " Conversely, the presence of a defendant who
was but slightly at fault might lead the jury to assess the damages in
an amount less than that which would adequately compensate the
plaintiff."
The first cases construing the statute concerned actions against
two or more persons for the joint commission of an intentional tort.
7
In these cases, the court held that the statute applied only if a com-
mon purpose or design to inflict the injury existed among the several
tortfeasors. In the absence of this concerted action, there was no
joint liability as contemplated by the statute and each tortfeasor was
liable only for the extent of the injury caused by his wrongful act.8
2 "Amount of negligence" and "degree of negligence" are used interchange-
ably in the cases.
3 1 Harper & James, Torts § 10.1, at 692 (1956).
4 Now Ky. Rev. Stat. § 454.040 (1959). See Louisville and N. R.R., v.
Roth, 180 Ky. 759, 772, 114 S.W. 264, 268 (1908), in which the court stated
that in no event shall the recovery exceed the amount claimed in the petition.5 Buckles v. Lambert, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 830, 884 (1868).
6 Id. at 884-35.
7 Henry v. Sennett, 42 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 311 (1843).
8Wilder v. Bailey 283 Ky. 288, 25 S.W.2d 381 (1930); Ferguson v. Terry,
40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 96 (1840).
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The rule requiring collusion among the torifeasors was also ap-
plied where the injury resulted from the commission of two or more
independent negligent acts. Since there could be no common pur-
pose or design to inflict the injury where the acts were merely negli-
gent, the court held that such persons were not joint torifeasors within
the meaning of the statute. Each was liable only for the injury caused
by his negligence,9 even though it might be difficult to determine
the casual connection between the act and a single injury.10
The first departure from this rule requiring either a common
purpose among the torifeasors or the assessment of damages in ac-
cordance with the injury caused by the act of each, was made in
Central Passenger Ry. v. Kuhn.1 In this case, the plaintiff recovered
separate judgments in an action against the company operating the
streetcar on which he was riding and a railroad company for in-
juries received in a crossing collision. On appeal, the court affirmed
the judgments, reasoning that the higher duty of care owed by the
streetcar company to its passenger afforded a basis for holding it
liable for a greater share of the damages. By dictum, the court added
that a reversal would only require the court below to enter a joint
judgment, the whole of which might be recovered of one, with no
right of contribution against the other.12 In the absence of different
standards of care owed by the tortfeasors to the injured party as a
basis for the apportionment of damages, the court in McCulloch's
Admr'r v. Abe l's Admr'r,13 although reversing for error in the instruc-
tions, again recognized the validity of separate judgments, stating:
[AI that can be reasonably done is to let the jury consider all the
circumstances and apportion the damages according to the amount
of negligence attributable to each of the offending parties.14
In the absence of statute,15 a majority of jurisdictions require
the return of a joint verdict where the concurrent negligence of joint
tortfeasors has caused a single, indivisible injury.' 6 The principle reason
advanced for this position is that disparities in degree of fault are
9 Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Nail, 178 Ky. 33, 41, 198 S.W. 745, 749
(1917); Polk v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 175 Ky. 765, 195 S.W. 129 (1917); Bonte
v. Postel, 109 Ky. 64, 72, 58 S.W. 536, 538 (1900).
3
0 Watson v. Pyramid Oil Co., 198 Ky. 135, 136, 248 S.W. 227, 228 (1923).
1186 Ky. 578, 6 S.W. 441 (1888).
12 Id. at 578, S.W. at 446.
13 272 Ky. 756, 115 S.W.2d 386 (1938).
14 Id. at 761, S.W.2d at 389.
'5 But see Ga. Code Ann., tit. 105, § 2011, which provides in part: "Where
several trespassers are sued jointly, . . . Itihe jury may . . . specify the particular
damages to be recovered of each, and judgment ... must be entered severally."
This statute has been held applicable only in actions of trespass to land. Gasaway
v. Nicholson, 190 Ga. 345, 9 S.E.2d 154 (1940).
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either not present or do not admit of sufficiently precise determin-
ation to ensure an equitable allocation of the damages.
17
Beyond the difficulty in providing competent evidence upon which
the jury may base an allocation of damages, this construction of the
statute is in conflict with the statutory right to contribution in Ken-
tucky. Kentucky Revised Statutes section 412.030 provides:
Contribution among wrongdoers may be enforced where the wrong is
a mere act of negligence and involves no moral turpitude.' 8
In an action of contribution, the damages are equally divided among
the joint torifeasors without inquiry into their degree of culpability. 19
It would seem that the statutes should be construed together and
that, in an action of contribution under Kentucky Revised Statutes
section 412.030, the liability of the several tortfeasors should be ap-
apportioned according to the degree of negligence, if apportion-
ment would have been proper under Kentucky Revised Statutes sec-
tion 454.040. However, the court has not construed them together, and
as a result the extent of liability of each tortfeasor may depend on
one or more of three factors: (1) the number of torifeasors sued
by the plaintiff; (2) the solvency of the several tortfeasors; and (3)
a reasonable settlement of the claim by one of the tortfeasors prior
to litigation.
First, the extent of liability of any one tortfeasor may depend
entirely on the manner in which the plaintiff proceeds in satisfac-
tion of his claim. If he chooses to join all of the tortfeasors in one
action, the jury, upon instructions requested by one of the defend-
ants,20 may return several verdicts in different amounts under Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes section 454.040. However, if he' proceeds
against only one of the tortfeasors, ultimately each will be liable for
an equal share of the damages21 since the original defendant may
21 The same result would follow if the plaintiff, after receiving a joint judg-
ment, executes it against only one of the defendants.
16 Annot. 108 A.L.R. 792,93 (1931). See e.g., Dextone Co. v. Building
Trades Council, 60 F.2d 47 (2d dir. 1932); Aitken v. White, 93 Cal. App. 134,
208 P.2d 788 (1949); Stoewsand v. Checker Taxi Co., 331 MI. App. 192, 73 N.E.
2d 4 (1947); Schoat v. Mariott, 119 Misc. 92, 194 N.Y. Supp. 849 (1922);
Emblem Oil Co. v. Taylor, 118 Pa. Super, 259, 179 Atl. 773 (1935).
17 See Legis., 45 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 375 (1931). For a general discussion
of fault as a basis of liability see, 2 Harper & James, Torts ch. 12 (1956).
18 See Legis., 45 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 371 (1931) for a criticism of the phrase,
no moral turpitude", where it is described as indefinite if not meaningless.
39 See Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Myers, 288 Ky. 337, 156 S.W.2d
161 (1941); Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16
(1932).
202 Stanley, Instructions to Juries § 603 (2d ed. 1957)provides:
The jury may find for one or more of the defendants and against the
other or others, or the jury may find separate verdicts for different
amounts against one or more, or all of the defendants, or it may
find for all of the defendants as hereinbefore set out.
1960]
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implead the other tortfeasors and through third-party procedure
claim contribution against the omitted tortfeasors. Upon the jury's
determination that all of the tortfeasors were negligent and that
their combined negligence was the proximate cause of the injury,
the total damages will be assessed against the original defendant.:2
In the absence of an amendment of the complaint to include the
added tortfeasors, they are in no respect liable to the plaintiff and
must pay a pro rata share of the damages only on complete satis-
faction of the judgment by the original defendant.
23
Second, if the plaintiff sues all of the torifeasors for a joint tort,
and the jury returns a joint verdict, the judgment entered upon that
verdict may be executed in full against either defendant. If one of
the defendants is insolvent the judgment can be executed against
the other. The latter tortfeasor's right of contribution is worthless
and as a result he must bear the loss resulting from the insolvency.
Also, if the plaintiff chooses to sue only one, the other torifeasor may
be brought in as a third-party defendant, but if he proves to be in-
solvent, the original defendant must bear this loss. The result is
otherwise however, if the jury makes an apportionment of the dam-
ages under Kentucky Revised Statutes section 454.040, in which
case the risk of insolvency is shifted to the plaintiff since each de-
fendant is liable only for the several judgment entered against him.
It appears that this result would seriously impair the primary ob-
jectives of victim compensation and loss distribution.
Third, an inchoate right to an action of conrtibution arises when
one tortfeasor makes a reasonable settlement in .full satisfaction of
the plaintiff's claim.24 Recovery is permitted only if it is shown that
the settlement was not excessive and made in good faith pursuant to
an honest compromise.25 Again, the amount of negligence of the sev-
eral tortfeasors is not determined and each must share equally in
compensating the injured party. Ignoring the degree of negligence
in this action would tend to discourage settlements by those tort-
feasors who assume that they would be deemed the least negligent
in an action under Kentucky Revised Statutes section 454.040.2o
22 Anderson v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 498 (W.D. Ky. 1953).23 An amendment of the complaint would not always be desired by the
plaintiff. E.g., where the injuries resulted from the combined negligence of the
plaintiff's insolvent husband and the driver of another automobile. Also, if the
statute of limitations has run before the other tortfeasor is added, the corn-
plaint may not be amended even though the original defendant's contribution
action is not barred.
24 Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16 (1932).
25 Lexington Glass Co. v. Surich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 271 S.W.2d
909 (Ky. 1954).
26 Conversely, by equally allocating the liability in an action of contribution
after a reasonable settlement has been made, the tortfeasor who assumes that
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It appears that the near impossibility of defining a standard to
measure degrees of culpability would result at times in an apportion-
ment based on nothing more than the mere conjecture of the jury.
27
Moreover, by permitting one joint tortfeasor to secure several judg-
ments, the plaintiff is necessarily deprived of the opportunity to
obtain a joint judgment. As a consequence he is assured compensa-
tion for his injuries only if all the tortfeasors were solvent. The con-
cept of a "joint tort" has considerably changed since the enactment
of Kentucky Revised Statutes section 454.040, and the underlying
purpose of this provision-the modification of the harshness of the
joint judgment-could now be served by the existing right of con-
tribution. By either repealing this statute, or by enacting legislation
basing recovery in an action of contribution on disparities of fault,
the legislature could alleviate the existing inconsistency in the two
methods of effecting loss distribution among joint tortfeasors.28 Such
action seems necessary in view of the increasing amount of litiga-
tion involving multiple collisions.
Jackson W. White
TORTS-PROXIVATE CAUSE-LIABILITY OF VENDOR OF INTOXICATING
LIQUORS TO TAIRD PERSONS.- Plaintiff, as administratrix of one whose
death was caused by collision with a car negligently driven by an
intoxicated minor, brought action for damages against four tavern
keepers for wrongful death and, in her capacity as owner, for dam-
ages to the car driven by decedent. She alleged that the four de-
fendants negligently and in violation of statute sold liquor to the
minor when he was intoxicated. The trial court granted de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that these
injuries were too remote to have been promimately caused by the
sale of the liquor. Held: Reversed. The decedent was within the
class which the statute was designed to protect. By prohibiting liquor
sales to minors and intoxicated persons, the legislature intended to pro-
tect the general public as well as these buyers. As to proximate cause,
he would be assessed with a greater share of the damages, might enter a com-
promise to avoid this consequence.
27 For an interesting case on jury apportionment see Beasley v. Evan's Adm'x,
311 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1958), in which the court reversed a jury verdict of
$15,000 against a non-resident tortfeasor and $642.44 against a local defendant.
See also Legis., 49 Harv. L. Rev. 312, 318 (1935).2 8 Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, and South Dakota have enacted legislation
basing contribution on relative degrees of fault: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1001 to
1009 (1947); Del. Ann. Code, titl. 10 § 6301-08 (1953); Hawaii Revised Laws
§ 10-16 (1955); S.D. Code, § 33.04A01-.04A10 (Supp. 1952). See also Gregory,
Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions 145 (1936).
